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ABSTRACT 
  Most Americans carry their cell phones everywhere. Cell phone 
users can purchase ringtones to replace the traditional telephone ring. 
But often the ringtones are excerpts from copyrighted works, 
including popular music. This technology has grown enormously in a 
short time span, forcing lawmakers to consider its applicability to 
copyright laws that predate ringtones’ existence by nearly fifty years. 
This Note examines the mechanical license provision of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, including its overlooked legislative history, to determine 
whether the mechanical license applies to ringtones. It concludes that 
the statute’s requirements exclude most types of ringtones from the 
scope of the mechanical license provision. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although some consider cell phone ringtones to be intolerably 
irritating and others find them to be a welcome respite from the more 
banal phone ring of the past, most people would probably agree that 
ringtones are ubiquitous. For those who download ringtones, the 
selected sound recording may denote one’s musical tastes and may 
even influence others who hear the ringtone to inquire further into a 
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given artist or song. Music played on cell phones is a rapidly growing 
market for recording artists and music publishers alike.1 This 
emerging market, although providing great potential to a struggling 
music industry,2 poses intricate legal questions whose answers could 
either spur growth in the market or destroy it. 
Each time a user downloads and plays a song through a cell 
phone, the copyrights involved in that particular song must be 
cleared.3 In broad terms, a cell phone ringtone, like any other musical 
recording, consists of both the sound recording and the underlying 
musical work,4 of which both must be licensed to avoid an 
infringement action.5 Record labels, which own the copyrights in the 
sound recordings,6 generally sell ringtones to phone companies. 
Although the record labels own the copyrights in the sound 
recordings, music publishers own the copyrights for the underlying 
musical works.7 Yet to sell ringtones to the phone companies (and 
ultimately to the consumer), the record labels must also receive a 
license from the music publisher. 
Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act)8 
provides a mechanical license which allows compulsory licensing of 
the underlying musical work at a royalty rate set by statute, thus 
obviating the need for costly negotiations.9 The Copyright Act, 
however, only allows the mechanical license to operate under certain 
circumstances, and it is unclear whether the license applies to cell 
 
 1. Indeed, a contributing factor is the marked increase in cell phone usage since 2000. See 
Dibya Sarkar, Cell Phone Spending Surpasses Land Lines, ABC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2007, 
http://i.abcnews.com/Technology/wireStory?id=4017522 (describing how cell phone spending 
has surpassed landline spending). 
 2. Paul B. Brown, Ring Tones to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at C5. 
 3. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .”). 
 4. For a discussion of the characteristics of these two separate copyrights and the 
distinctions between them, see infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. See ASCAP Licensing, Common Licensing Terms http://www.ascap.com/licensing/ 
termsdefined.html (last visited Apr. 31, 2008) (highlighting the fact that recording copyrights are 
owned by record labels). 
 7. It is important to distinguish between music publishers and record labels. Music 
publishers operate for the benefit of composers and songwriters, and they work with record 
labels to provide exposure and ultimately revenue to the songwriters. Id. Record labels play a 
similar role, albeit working with recording artists, by purchasing songs from the music publishers 
and increasing exposure to the recording artists. Id. 
 8. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2000). 
 9. Id. § 115. 
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phone ringtones. One administrative agency, the Copyright Royalty 
Board,10 has already weighed in on the decisive issue, ruling that some 
ringtones may qualify under the mechanical license.11 The courts have 
not yet taken up the issue. 
This Note addresses some of the legal questions concerning cell 
phone ringtone copyrights. Part I introduces the interplay between 
law and cell phone ringtones with a general discussion of the law of 
copyright in music followed by a discussion of how § 115 of the 
Copyright Act relates to ringtones. Part II.A gives special attention to 
distinguishing between different varieties of ringtones. This discussion 
provides necessary background for comprehending the Register of 
Copyrights’ Mechanical and Digital Rate Adjustment Proceeding 
(Copyright Proceeding)12 found in Part II.B. Taking one portion of 
the Copyright Proceeding—namely, the adaptation privilege—Part 
III analyzes the proper statutory interpretation of § 115’s adaptation 
privilege. This Part, in analyzing the adaptation privilege, determines 
that the proper statutory interpretation of § 115 pushes most 
ringtones outside its ambit. This conclusion has extraordinary 
implications for the ringtone industry and may translate to a startling 
increase in costs to license underlying musical works from the music 
publishers. 
I.  WHY CELL PHONE RINGTONES  
IMPLICATE COPYRIGHT’S MECHANICAL LICENSE 
A. General Discussion of the Law of Copyright in Music 
As compared with other forms of expression, musical works 
receive unusual treatment in the Copyright Act. First, musical works 
and sound recordings are separate and distinct categories of 
copyrightable works.13 In fact, although musical works—that is, the 
underlying composition and lyrics—have received federal copyright 
 
 10. The Copyright Royalty Board, an arm of the Copyright Register, consists of three 
judges who are appointed by the Librarian of Congress and whose primary responsibility is 
setting rates under the statute. Copyright Royalty Board, Background, http://www.loc.gov/ 
crb/background  (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 64,303 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order). 
 13. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (defining musical works and sound recordings as distinct 
categories of works of authorship). 
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protection since the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act),14 federal 
copyright law did not protect sound recordings15 until the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971.16 Prior to that, sound recordings were seen as 
unprotectable subject matter17 because Congress, in the 1909 Act, 
expressed the view that the composers were the creative authors, 
whereas the sound recording represented merely the mechanical 
reproduction of that creative work.18 This harsh regime changed in the 
early 1970s, when Congress formally brought sound recordings within 
the subject matter of copyright protection alongside all other forms of 
protectable expression in § 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.19 
Despite granting federal protection to sound recordings, the 1976 
Act provides thinner protection to sound recordings than other 
works, including the underlying musical work, in three primary ways. 
First, a sound recording is not accorded protection under § 106(4),20 
and thus, until 1995,21 there was no exclusive right of a sound 
recording artist to publicly perform the sound recording. As a result, 
anyone who publicly performed a copyrighted work could do so 
without permission from or payment to the sound recording copyright 
holder, provided that the performer obtained permission from and 
paid the musical work copyright holder.22 To remedy this, Congress 
 
 14. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 4952, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (superseded by 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2554). 
 15. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines sound recordings as “works that result from the 
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 16. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. The relevant sections 
were then relocated and rewritten by the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 101-810 (2000)). 
 17. Sound recordings were still subject to state and common law copyright protection, but 
this protection was uneven at best. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.10[B] (2007). 
 18. See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 9 (1909) (“It is not the intention of the committee to 
extend the right of copyright to mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the 
composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of 
the manufacture and use of such devices.”). 
 19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2554 (codifying sound recordings 
with the other permissible subject matters for copyrights at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)). 
 20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) (granting copyright protection to “literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works”). 
 21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 22. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.14[A]. For a general overview of the policy 
reasons behind not extending any sort of performance right to sound recordings, see Robert L. 
Bard & Lewis S. Kurlantzick, A Public Performance Right in Recordings: How to Alter the 
Copyright System Without Improving It, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152 (1974). 
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enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 
1995,23 which allows the copyright holder the exclusive right to 
authorize others “to perform the [sound recording] publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission.”24 Despite passage of the DPRSRA, 
protection to the copyright owner remains limited because it still 
allows any second comer to publicly perform the sound recording (so 
long as it is not a digital audio transmission)25 without compensating 
the recording artist.26 
The second primary vehicle for limiting the copyright protection 
accorded to music is § 114’s limitations on the § 106(6) copyright 
protection for sound recordings.27 Section 114 limits the sound 
recording copyright owner’s reproduction right and distribution right 
to the “actual sounds fixed in the recording.”28 In practical terms, this 
means that a sound recording copyright holder cannot claim 
infringement when another recording artist creates a cover of the 
song, even though the artist reproduces the sounds of the original.29 
Where digital reproduction of a sound recording occurs, the “actual 
 
 23. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114–15 (2000)). 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 
 25. A “digital transmission” is defined in § 101 as “a transmission in whole or in part in a 
digital or other nonanalog format.” Id. § 101. The DPRSA is more complex as some digital 
performances are exempt altogether, and although noninteractive services are covered by the 
statutory license, interactive services are fully subject to the exclusive rights of the sound 
recording copyright owner. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.21–24 
(detailing the various complexities of the DPRSA). Because this is beyond the scope of this 
Note, it is not necessary to further develop the details of DPRSA. 
 26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the performer would 
compensate the composer, lyricist, or music publisher. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
This compensation would be subject to the limitations on the public performance. 17 U.S.C.  
§ 110. 
 27. The Copyright Act does not provide blanket and exclusive protection on use; instead,  
§ 106 grants that a given copyright owner may hold only the right to reproduce (that is, the right 
to make copies), the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies to the 
public, the right to public performance, and the right to public display. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 28. Id. § 114(b) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under 
[the reproduction and adaptation rights] do not extend to the making or duplication of another 
sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though 
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”). 
 29. There may be an extremely rare case in which protection is accorded through publicity 
or misappropriation rights when a second comer is passing off the song for commercial 
advantage without attributing. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(“We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is 
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs 
and have committed a tort in California.”). 
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sounds fixed in the recording” are directly copied to a new medium.30 
This is a major limitation on the protection afforded sound recording 
artists, but its purpose is to promote the proliferation of creative 
works by allowing future artists to build on prior works.31 
Third, and perhaps most relevant for purposes of this 
examination of cell phone ringtones, is the § 115’s mechanical license, 
which limits a musical work’s copyright holder’s reproduction and 
distribution rights by requiring the rights holder to license the musical 
work in certain circumstances. Section 115 applies to copyright 
holders of nondramatic musical works, including music publishers, 
lyricists, and composers.32 It allows anyone wishing to reproduce the 
work to obtain a statutory mechanical license, but it does not apply to 
the sound recording copyright.33 Section 115 provides a statutory 
mechanical license by which anyone can either reproduce or 
distribute a phonorecord34 of the musical work so long as it has 
previously been distributed in phonorecords in the United States with 
authorization of the copyright owner and provided that 
compensation, as set forth by the Copyright Royalty Board,35 is paid 
to the copyright owner.36 The license is a “mechanical license” 
because the parties need not negotiate over terms; instead, everyone 
holds a license to either reproduce or distribute a musical work—
regardless of permission—so long as there is proper payment. The 
practical effect of the mechanical license is to turn this strand of 
 
 30. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–800 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This 
means that the world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the 
recording so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not made.”). 
 31. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 9 (1909) (“It is not the intention of the committee to 
extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the 
composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of 
the manufacture and use of such devices.”). 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 33. Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 34. Although much of the Copyright Act refers to “copies,” it defines “phonorecords” as 
those “material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later 
developed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 35. Id. § 801(b)(1). It should be noted that rates may also be set based on agreement of the 
parties. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[I] (“A copyright owner and a licensee 
phonorecord maker and/or distributor may elect to waive the compulsory license, and enter into 
a consensual agreement.”). The Copyright Royalty Board was formed in 2005 and consists of 
three judges whose primary role is to determine the rates and terms of the Copyright Act’s 
statutory licenses. Copyright Royalty Board, supra note 10. The judges are appointed by the 
Librarian of Congress. Id. 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)–(c)(1). 
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property rights into a liability rule,37 allowing anyone to use the 
owner’s property provided that such use is in accordance with the 
rules set forth in the statute. 
Congress passed Section 115 following White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,38 in which a plaintiff-composer brought 
suit to enjoin Apollo’s alleged infringement.39 Apollo was in the 
business of manufacturing player pianos which used perforated rolls 
to mechanically produce songs on the pianos.40 The Supreme Court 
ruled for the defendant, holding that the perforated music roll did not 
constitute a “copy” of the underlying musical work.41 In enacting the 
mechanical license in the 1909 Act, Congress intended to specifically 
overrule the holding in White-Smith to provide some means of 
compensation to the copyright owner for mechanical reproductions of 
their works.42 Congress attempted to address that concern by 
balancing the public’s interest in gaining access to the creative works 
with the overarching goal of compensating music composers 
adequately.43 Striking this balance would fulfill the constitutional 
prerogative “[t]o promote the Progress of Science.”44 
 
 37. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) (equating compulsory licenses with liability rules). 
 38. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Id. at 8–9. 
 41. Id. at 18 (“These perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly applied and 
properly operated in connection with the mechanism to which they are adapted, produce 
musical tones in harmonious combination. But we cannot think that they are copies within the 
meaning of the copyright act.”). 
 42. H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) (“This broad language is intended to avoid the artificial 
and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith . . . .”); see also 
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 
64,303, 64,304 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order) (“[The mechanical license was] 
originally enacted to address the reproduction of musical compositions on perforated player 
piano rolls . . . .”). 
 43. See Paul S. Rosenlund, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Compositions for 
Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 686 (1979) (“The feelings 
in Congress at the time were that the American public should continue to have access to the 
popular music of the day, but that the growing economic importance of mechanically 
reproduced music made it necessary to guarantee composers adequate compensation for their 
work.” (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909))). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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B. Section 115 and Cell Phone Ringtones 
The interpretation of § 115 is the primary source of controversy 
with respect to cell phone ringtones. This Section demonstrates that  
§ 115 is the primary source of concern in this debate because that 
provision determines whether recording labels, in preparing and 
vending ringtones to the phone companies, can purchase the rights to 
the underlying composition at the statutory rate, or whether they 
must conduct arms-length negotiations for these rights. 
The preamble to § 115 states that it affects only the copyright 
owner’s exclusive reproduction and distribution rights under  
§§ 106(1) and 106(3) of the Copyright Act.45 Thus, if ringtones are 
considered derivative works46 of copyrighted works, and thus subject 
to copyright protection under another provision, §106(2), they cannot 
be made or distributed using a § 115 mechanical license. On the other 
hand, if they do not qualify as derivative works, then § 115 may apply, 
and so ringtones must meet the conditions set forth in § 115(a). Thus, 
asking whether a given work could qualify as a derivative work is an 
important threshold question. 
Under the Copyright Act, a derivative work must “represent an 
original work of authorship,”47 meaning it requires a constitutionally 
minimum level of creativity.48 One district court judge elaborated on 
what would qualify as a derivative work in a musical composition: 
[T]here must be present more than mere cocktail pianist variations 
of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any 
competent musician. There must be such things as unusual vocal 
treatment, additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered 
harmonies, novel sequential uses of themes—something of 
substance added making the piece to some extent a new work with 
the old song embedded in it but from which the new has developed. 
It is not merely a stylized version of the original song where a major 
artist may take liberties with the lyrics or the tempo, the listener 
 
 45. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (“In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive 
rights provided by clauses (1) [to reproduce] and (3) [to distribute] of section 106 . . . are subject 
to compulsory licensing . . . .”). 
 46. A derivative work is defined in the Copyright Act as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any 
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id. § 101 (2000). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The Court noted 
that “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id. 
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hearing basically the original tune. It is, in short, the addition of such 
new material as would entitle the creator to a copyright on the new 
material.49 
This passage sets forth an originality requirement for derivative 
works in musical compositions. In fact, the originality requirement for 
derivative works50 is the same as for original works.51 Yet because  
§ 115 expressly does not affect the copyright owner’s exclusive right 
to create derivative works,52 a derivative work with the requisite 
originality likely would not fall within the bounds of the license. The 
Register of Copyrights acknowledged that if a particular work 
exhibited the constitutionally mandated “originality,” then it would 
fall outside the scope of § 115.53 This proposition is correct. The plain 
statutory language of § 115(a)(2) excludes those works that are 
changed to such a degree that they constitute derivative works,54 and 
this exclusion places a ceiling on the adaptation privilege55 that the 
 
 49. Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (footnotes omitted), rev’d 
on other grounds, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 50. A derivative work is defined in the Copyright Act as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any 
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 51. See id. § 103 (“The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 
includes . . . derivative works . . . .”); see also WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:50 
(2007) (“Moreover, the standard of originality for derivative works is no different than for 
nonderivative works.”). 
 52. Because the preamble to § 115 acknowledges only the right to copy and the right to 
distribute, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, it does not affect the right to create 
derivative works under § 106(2). 
 53. The Register of Copyrights explained: 
We note that Section 115 permits the creation of derivative works, but this privilege 
under the statutory license is limited to making musical arrangements necessary to 
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved. For 
purposes of our discussion in this proceeding, when we refer to derivative works not 
covered by Section 115, we mean those types of works that exhibit a degree of 
‘originality’ as that term is defined in court precedent. The addition of original 
material would not only take a ringtone outside the scope of the privilege of making 
arrangements, it would also take the ringtone outside the Section 115 license 
altogether. 
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 
64,303, 64,305 n.8 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order) (citation omitted). 
 54. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(2); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that  
§ 115 covers only the right to copy and the right to distribute, not the right to create derivative 
works). 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(2); see also infra Part III. 
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mechanical license grants.56 In other words, if a given arrangement has 
enough added creativity that it qualifies as a derivative work, it does 
not fall under the mechanical license. Yet, if the given arrangement 
has less originality—thus it does not qualify as a derivative work—it 
may fall under § 115, provided that it meets the other requirements of 
§ 115(a)(2). 
The relevant uncertainty, however, is whether these rights 
include the rights necessary to create a ringtone of the same 
composition. It is the recording labels, known as the “Big Four”— 
Universal Music Group, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, EMI 
Group, and Warner Brothers Music57—that sell ringtones to the 
phone companies. Thus, the record companies must have the 
necessary rights to the musical works from the music publishers to 
manufacture, distribute, or otherwise license these ringtones.58 This is 
the heart of the issue: must a record company secure such rights 
directly from the music publisher, or can it rely on the mechanical 
license and the corresponding statutory rate for copies? 
Record labels normally enter into arms-length negotiations with 
the music publishers to obtain the rights to the musical works to 
create, distribute, promote, and sell ringtones to phone companies 
like Verizon and AT&T.59 The rates that these license negotiations 
establish are considerably higher than the mechanical license rates set 
forth in § 115.60 Music publishers license works to record labels for as 
 
 56. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (“A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a 
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of 
interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not . . . be subject to 
protection as a derivative work under this title . . . .”). 
 57. Brett J. Miller, Comment, The War Against Free Music: How the RIAA Should Stop 
Worrying and Learn to Love the MP3, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 303, 319 n.115 (2005). 
 58. In some instances, ownership of the sound recording copyright may be a contested 
issue. Although the recording artist first performs the work, industry-standard contracts 
regularly treat sound recordings as works made for hire. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, 
§ 30.03[A] (setting forth an industry-standard contract). Even when the recording artist is a 
copyright owner, the artist may not be the only copyright owner. There may be producers, 
sound mixers, background musicians, and others who may contribute original expression 
sufficient to merit protection as a copyright owner. Consequently, who owns the copyright is a 
complicated issue, but for purposes of this Note, it is safe to assume that the recording studio 
owns the sound recording copyright, whether by operation of law or through contract. 
 59. See Neil J. Rosini & Michael I. Rudell, Ring Tone Revenues Foster Copyright Détente, 
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 2005, at 3 (analogizing the ringtone market to the CD industry, in which 
record labels obtain licenses from publishers and then produce and sell the CDs themselves). 
 60. Carmen Kate Yuen, Scuffling for a Slice of the Ringtone Pie: Evaluating Legal and 
Business Approaches to Copyright Clearance Issues, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 541, 544 (2006). 
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much as twenty-five cents per song, compared with the mechanical 
license’s rate of slightly over nine cents per song.61 Music publishers, 
therefore, would much prefer to leave the system as is, so that they 
could negotiate these licenses directly with the Big Four, thus 
garnering this higher rate. In contrast, the record labels argue that 
ringtones are subject to § 115 to obtain the statutory rate provided by 
the statute.62 But copyright owners generally complain that statutory 
rates are below market value, so record labels (probably fairly) 
expect to achieve a better deal through the § 115 license than they 
otherwise would in the marketplace.63 In a growing industry, the 
stakes are huge; given the huge volume of ringtones purchased each 
year,64 even a small change in royalties can pay huge dividends to the 
winner of this battle. In short, how copyright law determines this 
question can translate into tens of millions of dollars of lost yearly 
income for either music publishers or record labels. 
II.  CELL PHONE RINGTONES 
A. Distinguishing between Different Varieties of Ringtones 
To appreciate the subtleties of the applicable copyright laws, it is 
desirable—and perhaps necessary—to apply the law to varying types 
of ringtones. Like ice cream, ringtones come in many different 
flavors, each of which may have a differing treatment under 
copyright.65 For instance, a derivative work may result by reducing the 
melody to a simple monophonic tone—thus rendering it ineligible for 
the § 115 mechanical license—whereas an entirely different treatment 
may result from a ringtone that is a short snippet of the identical 
sound recording. Although it is not necessary to exhaust these 
 
 61. Id. (asserting that the traditional royalty sought by music publishers is approximately 
three times that set forth by the statute). 
 62. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 64,303, 64,305 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order). 
 63. Yuen, supra note 60, at 544 (“Publishers are accustomed to receiving ten percent of the 
retail price of ringtones, and since a master ringtone retails for $2.49 to $2.99, a publisher would 
be entitled to 24.9 to 29.9 cents per sale.”). 
 64. BMI, BMI Forecasts U.S. Ringtone Sales to Hit $600 Million in 2006, Apr. 2, 2006, 
http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/334746. BMI sold over 360 million ringtones from 2001 to 2005. 
Id. Ringtone sales reached $500 million in 2005 alone. Id. 
 65. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 64,304 (“[T]here are a variety of different types of ringtones ranging from those 
that are simple excerpts taken from a larger musical work to ones that include additional 
material and may be considered original musical works in and of themselves.”). 
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possibilities, this Section chooses four ringtones—each with differing 
characteristics—to better understand the law’s treatment of these 
types of works. 
The varying types of ringtones can best be described based on 
their degree of similarity to the original sound recording. That is, this 
scale is based on the amount of additional creativity needed to 
produce the ringtone.66 The first type of ringtone, beginning on the 
spectrum from the least amount of creativity required to produce a 
ringtone from the original, is a “true tone” or a “real tone.” A “true 
tone” is an exact duplication of a sound recording, albeit in a 
shortened form.67 For instance, Justin Timberlake’s “Rock Your 
Body”68 is a four-minute and twenty-seven-second song that was 
released in full form and played over the radio throughout the world. 
The “Rock Your Body” ringtone is a shortened version, playing 
approximately thirty seconds of the original song.69 Nothing about the 
song was changed; rather, the only “creativity” in compiling the 
ringtone was selecting which portion of the song to include. In this 
example—as in most true tones—the ringtone captures the “hook,” 
or the most popular refrain of a sound recording.70 By 2006, with the 
increasing popularity of cell phones with MP3 capability, this type of 
ringtone accounted for 60 percent of all ringtone revenues.71 
 
 66. The reasons for this scale are twofold. First, it provides a helpful guide for determining 
how far a ringtone strays from the original sound recording. This shift away from the original 
can greatly alter the copyright treatment of the ringtone, perhaps more than for any other 
variable. Second, courts have used this variable in determining the “transformative” nature of a 
work as a springboard for analyzing whether that work qualifies as a derivative work. See supra 
notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Steven Masur & Ursa Chitrakar, Essay, The History and Recurring Issues of 
Ringtones: Lessons for the Future of Mobile Content, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 152 (2006) 
(“Master Ringtones (also called ‘truetones’ or ‘mastertones’) are excerpts from the actual sound 
recordings of popular songs.”); Marcy Rauer Wagman & Rachel Ellen Kopp, The Digital 
Revolution Is Being Downloaded: Why and How the Copyright Act Must Change to 
Accommodate an Ever-Evolving Music Industry, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 288 n.63 
(2006) (“A ‘true tone’ or ‘trutone’ is a ringtone that is a short (approximately thirty-second) 
music clip edited directly from an original sound recording and made available to consumers for 
downloading onto their cell phones to represent their own, recognizable cell phone ring.”). 
 68. JUSTIN TIMBERLAKE, Rock Your Body, on JUSTIFIED (Jive Records 2002). 
 69. An example of a website from which to download the Justin Timberlake “Rock Your 
Body” ringtone is Thumbplay, Rock Your Body Ringtone, http://www.thumbplay.com/join/ 
Justin+Timberlake-artist-Rock+Your+Body-genre-ringtones-bonus (last visited Mar 17, 2008). 
 70. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 64,303, 64,305 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order). 
 71. Narasu Rebbapragada, The Playlist: Ring Tones Are Music Too, PCWORLD.COM, Mar. 
22, 2006, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,125125-page,1/article.html. 
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The second type of ringtone that illustrates the differing 
treatment of ringtones under the Copyright Act is similar to a true 
tone, except that it adds new material not otherwise found in the 
original sound recording. Perhaps the best example is Beyoncé’s “Let 
Me Cater 2 You” ringtone, which consists of a smaller portion of the 
actual song followed by Beyoncé’s voice proclaiming, “What’s up, this 
is Beyoncé from Destiny’s Child and this call is for you.”72 The status 
of these types—which can be called “true tones plus”—may vary 
considerably from actual true tones because of the additional 
commentary. Those ringtones that incorporate this additional 
commentary in lyrical and musical form are also included in this “true 
tones plus” category. 
The third and fourth categories of ringtones, which depart most 
from the original sound recording, are monophonic and polyphonic 
ringtones, respectively. Monophonic ringtones, which polyphonic 
ringtones largely have supplanted, introduced the ringtone to cell 
phone users. These ringtones play single notes in succession to create 
the impression that the actual sound recording is being played.73 
Oftentimes, it is difficult for the listener to even identify the song, 
because the simplicity of the one-note tune makes it difficult to 
transcribe complex sound recording arrangements. 
More easily identifiable as the original song, yet the ringtone 
which departs most from the original sound recording, are polyphonic 
ringtones. As cell phone speaker technology progressed, these 
ringtones became the standard, until cell phones with MP3 
technology began to play true tones.74 Polyphonic ringtones, as the 
name implies, play multiple lines simultaneously. Because multiple 
sounds emanate from a band—such as the voice, drums, and guitar 
sounds—these polyphonic ringtones more closely approach the 
rhythm and melody of the original sound recording.75 
 
 72. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,312; see also Scott Hervey, Copyright Office Clears the Way for More Ringtones, 
THEIPLAWBLOG.COM, Oct. 24, 2006, http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives/copyright-law-
copyright-office-clears-the-way-for-more-ringtones.html (suggesting that the Beyoncé ringtone 
could qualify as a derivative work). 
 73. Masur & Chitrakar, supra note 67, at 151 (“[Monophonic ringtones] means that single 
note sounds were played in succession when the phone rang.”). 
 74. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 64,304. 
 75. Id. at 64,305 n.16 (“In 2001, polyphonic ringtones were developed, allowing multiple 
notes to be played at the same time, creating a fuller-sounding ringtone.”). 
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Monophonic and polyphonic ringtones lie on the very end of the 
spectrum because they probably require a professional with a keen 
ear to manually transcribe the original sound recording.76 The final 
result is a ringtone which incorporates only the melody77 and rhythm78 
of a piece (and, in the case of a polyphonic ringtone, also the 
harmony79). Because it is not only possible but probable that two 
different transcribers can produce either a monophonic or polyphonic 
ringtone that is vastly different from one another, it is likely that 
there is a significant degree of creativity in these ringtones.80 
B. The Register of Copyrights’s Copyright Proceeding Decision 
On October 16, 2007, the Copyright Office, acting on a request 
on behalf of the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. 
(RIAA) to clarify the treatment of cell phone ringtones under 
existing copyright laws, handed down a final order in the Copyright 
Proceeding that concluded that ringtones could be subject to the 
mechanical licensing scheme.81 The National Music Publishers 
Association, Inc., the Songwriters Guild of America, and the 
Nashville Songwriters Association International (collectively, Music 
Publishers) filed a motion in opposition of the RIAA position. 
Although concluding that certain ringtones could be subject to 
mechanical licensing, the Register did also note that certain types of 
 
 76. M. D. Plumbley et al., Automatic Music Transcription and Audio Source Separation, 33 
CYBERNETICS & SYSTEMS 603, 608 (2002) (“Transcription of polyphonic music introduces a 
number of new complexities that are not present in the monophonic version of this problem. 
Because we have more than one possible note at once, we can no longer be sure that there will 
be a single delay at which the whole waveform will repeat . . . .”). This indicates that, even 
where transcription is done by computer, its translation to polyphonic forms involves an 
increased level of difficulty. 
 77. Melody is defined as “a rhythmic succession of single tones organized as an aesthetic 
whole.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 722 (10th ed. 2001). 
 78. Rhythm is “the aspect of music comprising all the elements (as accent, meter, and 
tempo) that relate to forward movement.” Id. at 1002. 
 79. Harmony is “the combination of simultaneous musical notes in a chord.” Id. at 530. 
 80. There are cases that say that exact replicas in different media, even if they require great 
skill, do not demonstrate sufficient originality to merit protection. E.g., Gracen v. Bradford 
Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying protection to a painting of Dorothy from The 
Wizard of Oz); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying 
protection to three-dimensional reproductions of Disney characters); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. 
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1976) (denying protection to Uncle Sam banks); Alfred Bell 
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (denying protection to a 
reproduced mezzotint engraving). 
 81. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 64,303, 64,303 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order). 
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ringtones, depending on their individual characteristics, could fall 
outside the scope of the statute.82 In examination of these issues, the 
Register identified a number of ambiguities with respect to the 
relationship between ringtones and § 115.83 This Section summarizes 
the issues raised in the Copyright Proceeding to provide some 
perspective as to how copyright laws treat ringtones generally. 
The first issue presented by the parties was whether ringtones 
meet the definition of “digital phonorecord deliveries.” The Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 199584 allows the 
licensee of a § 115 mechanical license to “distribute or authorize the 
distribution of a phonorecord of a nondramatic musical work by 
means of a digital transmission which constitutes a digital 
phonorecord delivery.”85 This amendment was a response to the 
newly developed use of transmitting songs digitally.86 The Register 
found that ringtones fit within the definition of digital phonorecord 
deliveries without much dispute from either party.87 
Next, the Register addressed the parties’ arguments concerning 
whether § 115 could license only portions of works, as compared with 
the entire work.88 Because ringtones necessarily use small portions of 
the longer sound recording, the RIAA argued that it could use the 
mechanical license even when only portions of the musical work were 
being used. The Register agreed with this point and, using traditional 
methods of statutory interpretation, concluded that “an excerpt may 
qualify for the statutory license if all other requirements are met.”89 
The Register adopted the RIAA’s argument that “[f]or the 
derivative work right to be infringed, the defendant must have 
created a derivative work, and for the derivative work to have been 
created, the Act requires the contribution of expressive content 
capable of standing on its own as a copyrightable work.”90 Thus, a cell 
 
 82. See id. 64,305 (“[D]ifferent types of ringtones may be treated differently for [statutory] 
purposes.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–15 (2000). 
 85. Id. § 115(c)(3)(A). 
 86. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.24[A]. 
 87. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,307. 
 88. Id. at 64,313–16. 
 89. Id. at 64,308. 
 90. Id. at 64,309 (quoting RIAA Initial Brief at 11, Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord 
Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,303 (No. RF 2006-1)). 
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phone ringtone, which is merely a shortened version of a sound 
recording, is not sufficiently original to be considered a derivative 
work. Although the Register did acknowledge that certain ringtones 
may be considered derivative works because they do exhibit a 
minimal degree of originality,91 it also concluded many ringtones 
would not fall under this category.92 In the end, the Register agreed 
with the RIAA’s argument that those ringtones which are merely 
shortened versions of the sound recording are not derivative works.93 
The Register refused to decide the issue of other ringtones, including 
those which contain new lyrics, stating that “they involve factual 
issues and potentially close questions that need not be resolved 
here.”94 
Following the discussion of derivative works, the Register then 
investigated what is at the crux of Part III: the arrangement privilege 
under § 115(a)(2).95 Suffice it to say that this portion of the opinion is 
subject to considerable criticism, and Part III.B discusses it in detail 
along with a fresh reading of the legislative history. Lastly, the 
Register’s office considered the private use exception,96 which states 
that, for § 115 to be applicable, the “primary purpose in making 
phonorecords [must be] to distribute them to the public for private 
use.”97 In addressing this potential complication, the Register 
distinguished between the intentions of the individual cell phone 
ringtone consumer and the distributor of the ringtone. So long as the 
distributor’s primary purpose was to distribute the digital 
phonorecord delivery for private use, the Register reasoned, then the 
individual ringtone consumer’s purpose is irrelevant.98 Thus, the 
Register concluded that the private use exception was a bar to the 
application of § 115. 
 
 91. A true tones plus may have been what the Register had in mind, as the additional lyrics 
or commentary could provide sufficient originality to constitute a derivative work. 
 92. Id. at 64,310. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 64,311. 
 95. Id. at 64,313–15. 
 96. Id. at 64,315. 
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2000). 
 98. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 64,314–15 (“[R]ingtones satisfy the private use requirement because the primary 
purpose of the distributor is to distribute them to individual consumers for their own personal 
use and enjoyment, on those consumers’ cell phones, in whatever manner the consumer sees 
fit . . . .”). 
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In a monumental loss to music publishers, the Register 
concluded that the RIAA could rely on § 115 to license most 
ringtones.99 For cell phone ringtones to fall within the mechanical 
license of § 115, the ringtones’ attributes must fall within the 
requirements set forth in the statute; yet, the Register’s Copyright 
Proceeding failed to fully dissect these requirements. Because the 
Register’s Copyright Proceeding does not bar judicial review,100 the 
Copyright Proceeding is not the definitive ruling on this issue. Indeed, 
its analysis did not bring clarity to this muddled area of law. 
Unfortunately, the Register bypassed the opportunity to set forth 
clear guidelines for the ringtone industry, and in doing so, opened the 
door to further challenges of these provisions. 
III.  THE ADAPTATION PRIVILEGE: HOW LIMITED? 
This Part examines one of the four requirements of § 115(a)(2)—
the arrangement privilege—and dissects it in a way that the courts 
may find helpful in the future. The arrangement privilege may be the 
most important issue for determining the status of ringtones under the 
Act for two reasons. First, neither courts nor commentators have 
expounded the impact of the adaptation privilege on the scope of the 
mechanical license. Indeed, the legislative history shows that 
Congress had intended the adaptation to be rather limited.101 Second, 
the Register’s analysis of the adaptation privilege is the most 
incomplete because it does not draw the line between ringtones that 
are covered by the privilege and those that are not. The Register and 
most scholars have analyzed § 115(a)(2) as a whole, losing sight of the 
four individual requirements explicitly set forth by Congress that a 
work must meet to qualify for the adaptation safe harbor. This Part 
explains each of these four requirements in detail, but it must be 
remembered that ringtones are only subject to the mechanical license 
if all four of the requirements are met.102 
 
 99. Id. at 64,304. 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1). 
 101. See infra Part III.B (discussing the legislative history behind § 115’s adaptation 
privilege). 
 102. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,303. 
  
1882 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1865 
The § 115 mechanical license allows limited,103 adaptation of the 
work without separately securing the authorization of the copyright 
owner. Specifically, § 115(a)(2) states: 
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical 
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the 
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but 
the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental 
character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a 
derivative work under this title, except with the express consent of 
the copyright owner.104 
This subsection allows the licensee at least some room to maneuver in 
making the new musical arrangement. Some have argued that it was 
necessary to draft some leeway into § 115 to further the goals of the 
mechanical license.105 In the end, the Register agreed with the RIAA’s 
argument that “shortening a musical work is necessary to conform the 
song to the style or manner of the performance involved because 
ringtones necessitate brevity.”106 
Because there is no case law interpreting § 115(a)(2),107 it is 
difficult to determine how a court dealing with the issue would 
respond. It is not a fruitless adventure, however; traditional notions of 
statutory interpretation provide useful guidance. The subsection 
seems to create a safe harbor to the compulsory licensee who alters 
the original so long as the alteration falls within the bounds of  
§ 115(a)(2). To obtain a mechanical license to create and distribute a 
ringtone that makes an alteration to the original musical work, the 
licensee must meet four requirements under § 115(a)(2). The 
subsection states, in full: 
 
 103. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“[T]he compulsory licensee’s right to 
make new arrangements is limited.”). 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). 
 105. Id. (“A limited adaptation right is clearly necessary if the compulsory license provision 
is to be implemented, inasmuch as different performers require some variation in musical 
arrangements.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 109 (1976) (“The second clause of subsection (a) [of 
§ 115] is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited privilege to make arrangements of 
music being used under a compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be perverted, 
distorted, or travestied.” (emphasis added)). 
 106. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,304. 
 107. See id. (“[D]efining the parameters of Section 115(a)(2) is difficult because there is no 
precedent . . . .”). 
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A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical 
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the 
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but 
the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental 
character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a 
derivative work under this title, except with the express consent of 
the copyright owner.108 
First, the alteration must be a change in the “arrangement” of the 
original.109 Second, the arrangement only must change “to the extent 
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the 
performance involved.”110 Third, the arrangement may not “change 
the basic melody” of the original.111 Lastly, the arrangement may not 
change “the fundamental character of the work.”112 These 
requirements are explicit in the statute, and any court that fails to find 
all four requirements as a precondition for § 115 is misapplying the 
statute. This Part analyzes all four of these conditions precedent in 
turn, providing an interpretation of § 115(a)(2) that may prove useful 
in the absence of meaningful guidance from either the Copyright 
Office or the courts. 
In the Copyright Proceeding, the Register merged the four 
requirements explicitly set forth by § 115(a)(2) in a way that loses 
sight of the distinct statutory components. Regarding the general 
arrangement requirement of the § 115(a)(2) safe harbor, the Register 
made three general observations: 
First, the user’s right to make a melodic arrangement should be 
limited so that the basic character of the musical work is preserved. 
Second, a mastertone that merely shortens the full length work to 
conform it to the physical limitations of the cellphone does not 
affect the musical work’s arrangement. Finally, a ringtone that 
makes minor changes to lyrics of the underlying musical work 
generally does not affect its arrangement.113 
The first observation simply restated the fourth requirement of  
§ 115(a)(2) that the arrangement may not change “the fundamental 
 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,314 (footnotes omitted). 
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character of the work.” It provided absolutely no insight into what an 
“arrangement” is. The second observation—that a mastertone which 
shortens the work does not affect the “arrangement”114—was similarly 
incomplete. Lastly, the Register stated that “minor changes” to the 
lyrics in a ringtone do not affect the “arrangement.”115 This 
observation is conclusory, and depend on what the “minor changes” 
are. Ultimately, the Register largely ignored the mandates of § 115 by 
failing to adequately address each of the four elements of the 
adaptation privilege. Separate consideration of each element leads to 
the conclusion that most ringtones are not necessarily covered by the 
mechanical license. 
A. “Arrangement” 
The first requirement—namely, that the given work is an 
“arrangement”—probably would not exclude a significant number of 
ringtones from the mechanical license. Determining whether a given 
alteration to a musical work changes the “arrangement” first requires 
a precise definition of “arrangement.” In the Copyright Proceeding, 
the meaning of the word was disputed, and each party provided 
definitions to best support its platform.116 Ultimately, the Register 
defined “arrangement” as “[t]he process or result of readjusting a 
work for performance by different artistic means117 from that 
originally intended.”118 
In short, the breadth of this definition—as interpreted through 
the Register’s definition—means that an “arrangement” may include 
 
 114. See infra Part III.A. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 64,313 (“[T]he parties have used various dictionaries and web sites to support 
their definitional argument, but there is no consensus on what sources are valid and reliable.”). 
 117. The Register did not address whether performance in the form of a ringtone on a cell 
phone rather than as a complete song in another medium is a performance “by different artistic 
means.” The Register seems to have concluded that it is by largely ignoring that portion of the 
definition. See id. at 64,314 (rejecting the music publishers’ claim that the ringtone is an 
abridgement rather than an arrangement, but not considering why the shortening of the original 
song was necessary). But is the conclusion supported? Is modifying a song to accommodate 
technical limitations of the media the same thing as “conform[ing] it to the style or manner of” 
the performer under § 115(a)(2) Beyoncé’s style is Beyoncé’s style. The monophonic ringtone of 
her song is not changed to conform to her style; it is changed to conform to the technical 
limitations of the technology on which it is played. The conclusion that these are necessarily 
“arrangements” may have been hastily arrived at. 
 118. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,314 (quoting WALDO SELDEN PRATT, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS (1929)). 
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all four representative types of ringtones. The true tone may be an 
arrangement because it shortens the work and repeats only a selected 
portion of the work. This is probably a “readjustment” of the work, 
even though the Register concluded that shortening a song does not 
affect its arrangement,119 because the selection of the part of the song 
that the ringtone plays may differ from what the artist originally 
intended.120 This definition also probably applies to both monophonic 
and polyphonic ringtones despite the technical requirements of 
producing these ringtone types,121 as the process of incorporating 
different instruments—in the case of ringtones, a synthesizer—
changes the composition by adding or removing harmonic elements 
of the work. The only type of ringtone that may not be within this 
category is the true tones plus ringtone, such as the one featuring 
Beyoncé,122 that adds additional spoken words. Because the spoken 
words are additional creative lines, they may be outside the scope of 
an arrangement and qualify as an entirely new derivative work.123 
With the derivative works issue aside, however, it is likely that even 
these true tones plus would fall within the definition of 
“arrangement.” After all, a musical notation of the ringtone can 
include the additional words of Beyoncé, and this difference readjusts 
the work from its original form.124 Thus, all four types of ringtones 
might qualify as arrangements but may still be subject to scrutiny 
under some of the other requirements before passing the § 115(a)(2) 
test. 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. After all, a given song could have various ringtones—all of which are unique—with 
each encompassing a different selection of the sound recording. 
 121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 124. A district court articulated the differences required to consider a work a derivative 
work: 
In order . . . to qualify as a musically ‘derivative work,’ . . . [t]here must be such things 
as unusual vocal treatment, additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered 
harmonies, novel sequential uses of themes—something of substance added making 
the piece to some extent a new work with the old song embedded in it but from which 
the new has developed. 
Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (emphasis added), rev’d on other 
grounds, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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B. “To the extent necessary . . .”125 
The second explicit limitation on the safe harbor provision for 
the adaptation right is a significant one; the arrangement may only be 
prepared “to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner 
of interpretation of the performance involved.”126 This restriction is 
perhaps the most constraining on the scope of the mechanical license, 
and yet commentators have misinterpreted it.127 
The legislative history behind this restriction merely echoes the 
statutory language and adds no insight into the meaning behind the 
clause.128 This legislative history does, however, acknowledge the 
purpose behind the broader subsection of § 115(a)(2), stating that the 
clause “is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited 
privilege to make arrangements of music being used under a 
compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be perverted, 
distorted, or travestied.”129 It must be stressed that this bit of legislative 
history illuminates the purpose behind all of § 115(a)(2). 
Commentators130—including Professor Nimmer—have failed to 
recognize this broader purpose and instead use the phrase “perverted, 
distorted, or travestied” to give meaning to the positive limitation 
that the arrangement be only “to the extent necessary.”131 
These commentators instead have read the clause to mean that 
when the “basic melody or fundamental character of the work” is left 
undisturbed, then the arrangement does not exceed the bounds of the 
“extent necessary to conform” requirement. Professor Nimmer, on 
the other hand, does acknowledge this clause, albeit in a backhand 
way. He states that 
 
 125. See infra note 128.  
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 127. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 128. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 109 (1976) (“Clause (2) [of § 115(a)] permits 
arrangements of a work ‘to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of 
interpretation of the performance involved,’ so long as it does not ‘change the basic melody or 
fundamental character of the work.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2))). 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. See, e.g., Mario F. Gonzalez, Are Musical Compositions Subject to Compulsory 
Licensing for Ringtones?, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 11, 24 (2006) (failing to find the word 
“necessary” to be of any significance); Robert J. Morrison, Deriver’s Licenses: An Argument for 
Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 87, 97 
(2006) (same). 
 131. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“Still, the variation may not be so 
great as to allow the music to be ‘perverted, distorted or travestied.’”). 
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if there is to be a right at all to record anew under the compulsory 
license, it must envisage some minimal change and new 
arrangement, if only to conform to the range and style of the 
licensee’s performers. Still, beyond such necessary changes, the 
compulsory licensee’s right to make new arrangements is limited.132 
Aside from this brief tribute of the “to the extent necessary” clause, 
however, Nimmer does little to advance any notion of what it does or 
should mean. Perhaps this is because no court has analyzed the scope 
of § 115(a)(2)133 or perhaps it is because Nimmer does not recognize 
the “necessary to conform” clause to be a separate and independent 
requirement. 
Congress does not often use the word “necessary” in the 
Copyright Act, and so it is unwise—perhaps irresponsible—to read 
such a robust adjective out of the statute. In fact, aside from the 
provisions describing the responsibilities of the Copyright Tribunal 
Board,134 the word “necessary” only appears three times throughout 
the entire Copyright Act as originally enacted.135 Furthermore, the 
legislative history supports this view. The legislative history 
demonstrates that the phrase “to the extent necessary” has real bite 
that cannot be ignored. Yet no case, treatise or law review article136 
even has analyzed this history. 
In 1964, more than a decade before the final enactment of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a 
hearing to analyze various sections of the Act to determine their 
 
 132. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 133. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 116(c)(5), 805(a), 806(a), 90 Stat. 
2541, 2564, 2598 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 116, 805–06 (2000)) (using the word 
“necessary”). 
 135. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(4), 115(a)(2), 708(c) (2000) (using the word “necessary”). The 
word “necessary” does appear more regularly in later amendments to the Copyright Act, 
including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) 
(using the word “necessary” thirteen times). 
 136. The legislative history behind § 115(a)(2) has been acknowledged. See Theresa M. 
Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Goodbye to Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical 
Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 297–98 
(2001) (discussing the “compromise of 1964”). Bevilacqua’s discussion, however, focuses more 
on the phrase “fundamental character of the work” rather than the instant discussion of the 
“extent necessary to” clause. See id. (discussing the debate over whether to limit an artist’s 
adaptation right). 
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feasibility.137 In the context of the § 115 license,138 then-current 
Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, presented three 
different versions of the compulsory license. The first, labeled 
Alternative A, simply eliminated the compulsory license.139 
Alternative B, which garnered the most support and eventually was 
incorporated into § 115 of the 1976 Act,140 included a similar provision 
to § 115(a)(2).141 Lastly, Alternative C attempted to find middle 
ground between the first two alternatives by creating a compulsory 
license only after a five-year period following the initial distribution, 
during which the copyright owner would have exclusive rights to 
mechanical reproductions.142 
Alternative B contained a phrase very similar to § 115(a)(2)’s 
arrangement provision, which allowed for the “privilege of making 
whatever arrangement or adaptation of the work may be reasonably 
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the 
performance involved.”143 In contrast, § 115(a)(2) allows the licensee 
to arrange the work only “to the extent necessary” within the style or 
manner of interpretation of the performance involved.144 The hearings 
on this “reasonably necessary” adaptation right included two 
exchanges in which representatives of music authors and publishers 
argued that the language was too generous to the licensee. It is likely 
that such dialogues contributed, at least in part, to the subsequent 
deletion of the word “reasonably” in the resulting legislation. 
 
 137. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND 
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 1 (Comm. Print 1964). 
 138. This license is § 115 in the Copyright Act of 1976; in these hearings, the license was 
referred to as § 11. 
 139. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 8 (providing the text of 
Alternative A); 3 THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND 
ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 13–14 
(Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone eds., 1983). 
 140. Bevilacqua, supra note 136, at 297–98. 
 141. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 8–11 (“The privilege of 
making a sound recording under a compulsory license . . . shall also include the privilege of 
making whatever arrangement or adaptation of the work may be reasonably necessary to 
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved.”); 3 THE 
KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 139, at 14–16 (same). 
 142. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 11–13 (providing the 
text of Alternative C); 3 THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 139, at 
16–18 (same). 
 143. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 9 (emphasis added). 
 144. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000) (using the word “necessary”). 
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First, Julian Abeles, a member of the Music Publishers’ 
Protective Association, representing the Harry Fox Agency145 at the 
hearing, commented on the adaptation phrase.146 After analyzing the 
language, Abeles came to the conclusion that this did not sufficiently 
protect the copyright owner. Specifically, Abeles testified “that this is 
a dangerous provision because, under that provision, radical 
alterations can be made to the material detriment of the work.”147 He 
viewed the provision as allowing too expansive of a right to the 
licensee. 
Second, Leon Kellman, representing the American Guild of 
Authors and Composers, testified on the same provision of 
Alternative B.148 His words are worth repeating: 
Now, this arrangement provision causes a great fear in my mind in 
another respect. We think of arrangements in terms of pop songs. 
What about serious music—the man who writes a symphony, a 
sonata, something where the orchestration and the arrangement are 
an integral part of the composition? Will this provision give anyone 
the right to make a crazy arrangement—to jazz it up, to make his 
own arrangement? This provision is, as someone here said, “rough 
on serious music.” It is horrible for serious music, and I think you 
are going to have to make a distinction in preserving the integrity of 
that type of music, which must not be rearranged.149 
Kellman and Julian Abeles both felt the need to constrain the 
proposed arrangement privilege. 
A later bill introduced in Congress, H.R. 4347,150 amended the 
proposed language to accord with the language in § 115(a)(2): “A 
compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical 
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the 
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved . . . .”151 
The modifier “reasonably” was dropped. Although the legislative 
 
 145. The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. is the primary organization facilitating the mechanical 
compulsory license by collecting and distributing the fees on behalf of music publishers. See 
Harry Fox Agency, About HFA, http://www.harryfox.com/public/HFAHome.jsp (last visited 
Apr. 31, 2008). 
 146. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 216–17. 
 147. Id. at 217. 
 148. Id. at 231–32. 
 149. Id. at 232. 
 150. See 111 CONG. REC. 2076 (1965) (recording the introduction of H.R. 4347 on February 
4, 1965). 
 151. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. (1965). 
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history does not explain this change, Kellman’s and Abeles’s 
comments reflected a desire to constrict the previously flexible 
language of “reasonably necessary.” The change directly followed the 
testimony, and because there were no other indications of alternative 
grounds for the change, their testimony likely prompted the more 
restrictive language found in § 115(a)(2). 
The music industry must take this change in the legislative 
history seriously. Although reliance on the compulsory license may be 
minimal152 because most licenses are operated consensually at a price 
lower than the statutory minimum,153 the § 115 compulsory licenses 
play an important practical role. Because parties always may invoke 
the compulsory license if negotiations fail, all voluntary negotiations 
are conducted in the shadow of the mechanical license. Thus, a 
change in the interpretation or application of § 115(a)(2) would have 
a significant impact on the ringtone industry, notwithstanding the fact 
that the trade may not rely on the license for royalties. 
So where does all of this lead? The provision, as supplemented 
by the legislative history of the term “necessary,” sets an outer limit 
to the amount of alteration to the original that may be incurred. The 
licensee is entitled to make an “arrangement” of the work but only 
“to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of 
interpretation of the performance involved.”154 Perhaps the best way 
to see what this mandate entails is to see what works change their 
status under § 115(a)(2) with this legislative gloss.155 
Applying this legislative gloss to the four types of ringtones, only 
some meet the requirements for a mechanical license under § 
115(a)(2). When adapting a sound recording to become a ringtone, it 
is necessary to conform the original musical work to the inherently 
short nature of a ringer on a cell phone (that is, twenty to thirty 
seconds). Although shortening the ringtone would be permissible 
under § 115(a)(2), what about other changes? Monophonic and 
polyphonic ringtones156 too would fall within what is necessary to 
 
 152. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[I] (“In actual practice, the statutory 
mechanism is rarely invoked in the industry.”). 
 153. Id. (“Given that a record manufacturer can always threaten to invoke the compulsory 
license without the copyright owners’ consent, the statutory scheme functions as a ‘ceiling’ on 
the price that those owners may charge, absent an agreement among the parties.”). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000). 
 155. See supra Part II.A. 
 156. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
  
2008] CELL PHONE RINGTONES 1891 
conform to the medium of a cell phone ringtone. After all, 
monophonic and polyphonic ringtones are precisely the sort of 
reproduction that is embodied in the statute, because it is necessary to 
use a synthesizer to reach the desired interpretation. 
But what if the polyphonic ringtone also included Beyoncé’s 
speaking voice? Assuming that the other criteria of § 115(a)(2) are 
met,157 it is likely that this change on the phonorecord would extend 
beyond that which is necessary to conform the original musical work 
to the ringtone medium. It would suffice for the ringtone to have 
merely the song without more. Adding Beyoncé’s speaking voice 
even without changing the melody or the fundamental character of 
the work goes beyond what is “necessary.” Ultimately, whether these 
ringtones may included within § 115 will relate to whether that 
portion of the ringtone is part and parcel of the arrangement or 
merely constitutes additional material which falls outside the scope of 
the ringtone’s arrangement of the original work. Courts should 
interpret the text and legislative history of the statute to reflect the 
congressional intent. 
C. Change “the Basic Melody” 
The third requirement expressed in § 115(a)(2) is that a given 
ringtone “shall not change the basic melody” of the original.158 This 
barrier to the mechanical license, like “to the extent necessary” 
clause, may pose a significant hurdle to the record labels’ claim to the 
mechanical license. To illustrate, consider the analogy between a true 
tone in which a small portion of the overarching song is lifted and 
looped to form the ringtone and a writer lifting a small quotation out 
of a book. In both cases, the portion lifted has creative components; 
even a few sentences of a book or a few seconds from a song meet the 
originality requirement set forth by the Supreme Court in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.159 As the amount 
 
 157. This ringtone would be an arrangement because its polyphonic nature would require 
rearranging the work to a synthesizer. If the speaking voice came at the end of the song, then it 
would not alter the melody of the work. Yet if Beyoncé is not the author of the musical 
composition, this change might “alter the fundamental character of the work.” 17 U.S.C.  
§ 115(a)(2); see also Bevilacqua, supra note 136, at 309–10 (advocating an increased recognition 
for an author’s moral rights through § 115(a)(2)). 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). 
 159. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original . . . means 
only that the work was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.”); see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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lifted becomes smaller, it may approach unprotectability. For 
instance, any two words from a book, no matter how creative the 
entire book is, will not be accorded protection because copyright law 
will not remove a two-word combination of expressing ideas from the 
public domain.160 Likewise, any two chords lifted from an original 
song will not be protected.161 
There is a line between what is protectable and unprotectable, 
but the real question becomes whether lifting a ten or fifteen second 
portion of the song is a change in the basic melody such that it 
violates § 115(a)(2). The answer depends on the characterization of 
the melody. If the melody is that of the entire work, then cutting out a 
portion of the work changes the melody. In contrast, if the melody is 
seen as small segments of melody which, when combined in a 
sequential matter, comprise the song, then lifting one full segment 
does not change the melody. Luckily, it is not necessary to choose 
sides; Congress has done so already. Section 115(a)(2) requires that 
“the arrangement shall not change the basic melody . . . of the 
work.”162 The “work” is the entire musical work, and the melody of 
the work therefore must be the entire melodic sequence of the song.163 
Thus, under a strict interpretation of the text, it is possible that a 
court using this reasoning would infer that any shortening of the work 
alters the basic melody. 
 
 160. Ideas are not protected under the Copyright Act, only expression. See 17 U.S.C.  
§ 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea . . . .”). 
 161. But see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656–61 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that digital sampling, even involving only three notes at a time, constituted copyright 
infringement), amended on reh’g by 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 162. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 163. Although the Copyright Register did address the copyright owners’ contention that 
Congress’ use of “works” rather than “portions of works” signifies that the work as a whole is to 
be considered, this was in the context of the broader outline of § 115. See Mechanical and 
Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,303, 64,307–09 
(Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order) (“Copyright Owners argue that because a ringtone 
is not a reproduction of the entire musical work it is not subject to the [§ 115] statutory 
license.”). These arguments cannot refute § 115(a)(2)’s explicit reference to the “melody of the 
work” because lifting only a portion of the work necessarily impairs the melody of the entire 
work. To read the statute otherwise would render the word “melody” superfluous if the 
underlying “work” could be shortened so that the melody shrinks into oblivion. 
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D. “Fundamental Character” 
The fourth and final requirement found in § 115(a)(2) is that 
“the arrangement shall not change the . . . fundamental character of 
the work.”164 This factor, however, is unlikely to affect whether a 
given ringtone is included in the mechanical license, because any 
ringtone that already passes through the other three hurdles is 
unlikely to affect the “fundamental character” of the original. 
The “fundamental character” element represents the outer 
bound of the safe harbor, although the phrase is not defined in the 
Act. It does, however, connote a broader meaning than merely 
changing the basic melody. In fact, it envisions a limited regime of 
moral rights, in which the integrity of the author and her work are 
protected, to the owner of the musical work copyright, often not 
found in the American system of copyright law.165 How far these 
moral rights travel in protecting the composer is a matter of much 
more uncertainty. There is one principle with which few courts or 
commentators would disagree: if a musical work consists of both 
instrumental music and corresponding lyrics, it does not violate the 
“fundamental character” of the work to invoke the mechanical 
license in a purely instrumental version with no lyrics.166 
With this notion in mind, it may be difficult to argue that any of 
the representative types of ringtones which have already passed the 
previous three filters of § 115(a)(2)—the “arrangement requirement,” 
the all-important “extent necessary to” obstacle, and the “basic 
melody” hurdle—actually does change the “fundamental character” 
of the work. After all, monophonic and polyphonic ringtones are also 
instrumental representations of the sound recording. Of course, true 
tones stay even closer to the original by merely shortening the work. 
 
 164. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). 
 165. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“Such respect for the integrity of a 
musical composition evinces Congressional regard for the moral rights of composers, the sole 
explicit recognition of moral rights in the entire Copyright Act until passage of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 166. See id. (noting that courts have recognized a licensee’s right to “produce a purely 
instrumental version” of “an authorized recording contain[ing] both music and lyrics”). One 
commentator has observed: 
[I]t is difficult to see how an instrumental version of a song could be said to “distort, 
pervert or make a travesty” of a composition. It is even more difficult to see how such 
a transformative and original musical arrangement would not contain the requisite 
originality to be considered a composition deserving full copyright protection in its 
own right. 
Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain’t Good, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1955 (2005). 
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The additional lyrics added in a true tones plus ringtone may, 
depending on its substance, cross the line, but presumably such a 
ringtone would already be eliminated from the mechanical statutory 
license because it constitutes a derivative work.167 
The idea that this fourth and final requirement actually lacks 
substantive teeth may be ironically fitting. In a legal system largely 
devoid of protecting the moral rights of copyright owners, it should 
come as no surprise that the mechanical license is no different. In 
practical effect, the “fundamental character” requirement, like the 
three other hurdles of § 115(a)(2), lends itself toward restricting the 
licensee’s ability to pervert or travesty the original musical work while 
still providing for a limited adaptation right for the proliferation of 
musical works to be enjoyed by the public at large. 
CONCLUSION 
Cell phone ringtones have grown enormously in popularity,168 
and with this surge comes a significant increase in revenue for the 
industry. Indeed, monetary rewards are precisely the type of 
compensation that the Framers thought best to encourage the 
proliferation of creative works.169 As such, they developed a system of 
copyright to ensure that monetary rewards, when paid to the 
copyright owners, would then encourage the artist to create more 
works. A shift in these expectations could fundamentally alter the 
rewards-based system, with the result that artists actually become 
discouraged from creating new works. As a result, it is essential that 
these rewards are paid to the correct party, and to that end, this Note 
proposes a new approach for interpreting § 115. 
The statutory language of § 115(a) and its corresponding safe 
harbor subsection of § 115(a)(2) can be read either as a whole or in 
part. The former approach, which most commentators appear to have 
taken, allows any adaptation so long as it does not “pervert[], 
distort[], or travest[y]”170 the original work. This interpretation seems 
 
 167. See supra Part I.B. 
 168. Victoria Shannon, Global Market for Cellphone Ring Tones Is Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 31, 2007, at C2. 
 169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.03[A] n.2 
(“[T]he real purpose of the copyright scheme is to encourage works of the intellect, and . . . this 
purpose is to be achieved by the reliance on the economic incentives granted to authors and 
inventors by the copyright scheme.”). 
 170. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 109 (1976). 
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to be in contradiction to the “limited” adaptation privilege that was 
envisioned by the enacting Congress.171 The latter interpretation—
reading the statutory language literally and carefully—results in an 
approach that is much more faithful to the legislative history and 
traditional methods of statutory interpretation. This Note endorses 
that latter approach. Either way, much of what this Note explores will 
be resolved not in the Register’s office, but in the courts. The 
financial stakes of the model of statutory interpretation that the 
courts ultimately choose are high. In the case of ringtones, it 
determines how much record companies will have to pay to music 
publishers and ultimately how much consumers will have to pay for 
their ringtones. The courts’ final say on the matter will have a 
dramatic impact on the burgeoning market for ringtones. 
 
 171. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“[T]he compulsory licensee’s right to 
make new arrangements is limited.”). 
